On the Controllability of Artificial Intelligence: An Analysis of Limitations


  • Roman V. Yampolskiy University of Louisville, USA




AI safety, control problem, safer AI, uncontrollability, unverifiability, X-risk


The invention of artificial general intelligence is predicted to cause a shift in the trajectory of human civilization. In order to reap the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of such a powerful technology it is important to be able to control it. However, the possibility of controlling artificial general intelligence and its more advanced version, superintelligence, has not been formally established. In this paper, we present arguments as well as supporting evidence from multiple domains indicating that advanced AI cannot be fully controlled. The consequences of uncontrollability of AI are discussed with respect to the future of humanity and research on AI, and AI safety and security.


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Author Biography

Roman V. Yampolskiy, University of Louisville, USA

Roman V. Yampolskiy has a BS/MS in Computer Science 2004 (RIT), PhD in Engineering and Computer Science 2008 (UB). He is a tenured associate professor in the department of Computer Science and Engineering at the Speed School of Engineering, University of Louisville (2008–). He is the founding and current director of the Cyber Security Lab and an author of many books including Artificial Superintelligence: a Futuristic Approach. During his tenure at UofL, Dr. Yampolskiy has been recognized as: Distinguished Teaching Professor, Professor of the Year, Faculty Favorite, Top 4 Faculty, Leader in Engineering Education, Top 10 of Online College Professor of the Year, and Outstanding Early Career in Education award winner among many other honors and distinctions. Dr. Yampolskiy is a Senior member of IEEE, AGI and Member of Kentucky Academy of Science. His main areas of interest are AI safety and cybersecurity, he is an author of over 200 publications including multiple journal articles and books.


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