Analytic Study of Features for the Detection of Covert Timing Channels in NetworkTraffic

Authors

  • Félix Iglesias Vázquez CN Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Austria
  • Robert Annessi CN Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Austria
  • Tanja Zseby CN Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Austria

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13052/2245-1439.632

Keywords:

Covert timing channels, Network traffic analysis, Classification, Anomaly detection, Feature selection

Abstract

Covert timing channels are security threats that have concerned the expert community from the beginnings of secure computer networks. In this paper we explore the nature of covert timing channels by studying the behavior of a selection of features used for their detection. Insights are obtained from experimental studies based on ten covert timing channels techniques published in the literature, which include popular and novel approaches. The study digs into the shapes of flows containing covert timing channels from a statistical perspective as well as using supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms. Our experiments reveal which features are recommended for building detection methods and draw meaningful representations to understand the problem space. Covert timing channels show high histogramdistance based outlierness, but insufficient to clearly discriminate them from normal traffic. On the other hand, traffic features do show dependencies that allow separating subspaces and facilitate the identification of covert timing channels. The conducted study shows the detection difficulties due to the high shape variability of normal traffic and suggests the implementation of semi-supervised techniques to develop accurate and reliable detectors.

 

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Author Biographies

Félix Iglesias Vázquez, CN Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Austria

Félix Iglesias Vázquez was born in Madrid, Spain, in 1980. He obtained the Dipl.-Ing. in electrical engineering and MAS in IT from the Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain. In 2012 he received the Ph.D. degree in technical sciences from TU Wien, Austria, where he currently holds a University Assistant position doing fundamental research in data analysis and network security. He has worked on R&D for diverse Spanish and Austrian firms, and lectured in the fields of electronics, physics, automation, machine learning and data analysis.

Robert Annessi, CN Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Austria

Robert Annessi received his B.Sc. and his M.Sc. degrees in computer engineering from TU Wien in 2011 and 2014 respectively. He is genuinely interested in communication networks, network security, and privacy, and is currently pursuing his Ph.D in the area of secure group communication for critical infrastructures. His further research interests are anonymous communication, covert communication, and subliminal communication.

Tanja Zseby, CN Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Austria

Tanja Zseby is a professor of communication networks in the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology at TU Wien. She received her Dipl.-Ing. degree in electrical engineering and her Ph.D. (Dr.-Ing.) from Technical University Berlin, Germany. Before joining TU Wien she led the Competence Center for Network Research at the Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems (FOKUS) in Berlin and worked as visiting scientist at the University of California, San Diego.

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Published

2017-11-30

How to Cite

1.
Vázquez FI, Annessi R, Zseby T. Analytic Study of Features for the Detection of Covert Timing Channels in NetworkTraffic. JCSANDM [Internet]. 2017 Nov. 30 [cited 2024 Apr. 26];6(3):245-70. Available from: https://journals.riverpublishers.com/index.php/JCSANDM/article/view/5245

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