Prevalence of IoT Protocols in Telescope and Honeypot Measurements

Authors

  • Lionel Metongnon Universit´e catholique de Louvain, Belgium and Universit´e d’Abomey-Calavi, Bénin
  • Ramin Sadre Universit´e catholique de Louvain, Belgium

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13052/2245-1439.832

Keywords:

Internet measurement, IoT, IoT attacks, IoT protocols

Abstract

With the arrival of the Internet of Things (IoT), more devices appear online with default credentials or lacking proper security protocols. Consequently, we have seen a rise of powerful DDoS attacks originating from IoT devices in the last years. In most cases the devices were infected by bot malware through the telnet protocol. This has lead to several honeypot studies on telnet-based attacks. However, IoT installations also involve other protocols, for example for Machine-to-Machine communication. Those protocols often provide by default only little security. In this paper, we present a measurement study on attacks against or based on those protocols. To this end, we use data obtained from a /15 network telescope and three honey-pots with 15 IPv4 addresses. We find that telnet-based malware is still widely used and that infected devices are employed not only for DDoS attacks but also for crypto-currency mining. We also see, although at a much lesser frequency, that attackers are looking for IoT-specific services using MQTT, CoAP, UPnP, and HNAP, and that they target vulnerabilities of routers and cameras with HTTP.

 

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Author Biographies

Lionel Metongnon, Universit´e catholique de Louvain, Belgium and Universit´e d’Abomey-Calavi, Bénin

Lionel Metongnon is a Ph.D. student at ICTEAM institute of Université catholique de Louvain at Belgium, since Spring 2015. He attended the Université d’Abomey-Calavi in Bénin where he received his B.Sc. in Electrical engineering and industrial IT in 2011 and his M.Sc. in Computer Science in 2014. His Ph.D. works focus on network monitoring and distributed Internet-scale intrusion detection for Internet of Things.

Ramin Sadre, Universit´e catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Ramin Sadre has been a professor in the ICTEAM institute of UCLouvain, Belgium, since 2014. Before that, he was an assistant professor at Aalborg University, Denmark, and a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Twente, the Netherlands. His research activities focus on performance evaluation, monitoring of networked systems, and network-based intrusion detection, targeting open Internet-wide distributed applications as well as more closed systems such as IoT and SCADA.

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Published

2018-12-18

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Articles